A large literature studies bank regulatory policies intendedto control moral hazard problems associated with depositinsurance and optimal regulatory design. Much of theanalysis has focused on uniform bank capital requirements,risk-based capital requirements, risk-based or fairly pricedinsurance...

I develop methods that produce consistent estimates of the Vasicek-Basel IRB (VAIRB) credit risk model parameters. I apply these methods to Moody's data on corporate defaults over the period 1920–2008 and assess the model fit and construct hypothesis tests using bootstrap methods. The results...

This paper investigates the effect of bank failures on economic growth using data from 1900 to 1930, a period that predates active government stabilization policies and includes periods of banking system distress that are not coincident with recessions. Using both VAR and a...

Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) requires regulators to sanction banks before they become insolvent and to resolve institutions within 90 days of reaching critically undercapitalized status. Forensic studies of the financial crisis conclude that the PCA process not only failed to rehabilitate...

In the full version of their paper (Kupiec and O'Brien [1998]), the authors show that modeling specializations have been important for policy results frequently cited in the literature. This shorter version of the paper is limited to showing that substantial difficulties in optimal regulatory...

Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements. If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a...

This paper considers characteristics of the capital requirements proposed in The New Basel Capital Accord (2001). Formal analysis identifies calibration features that could give rise to unintended consequences that may include: concentration of credit risk in institutions that are less well...