We examine maximin and minimax strategies for firms in asymmetric duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider two patterns of game; the Cournot game in which strategic variables of the firms are their outputs, and the Bertrand game in which strategic variables of the firms are the prices of...

Adoption of new technology by firms is very important for economic growth of a country. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive industries from the point of view of social welfare. Then, subsidization or taxation by the government is necessary. We present an analysis...

We consider a problem of subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by duopolistic firms. The technology is developed in and transferred by a foreign country to the domestic country. It is free but each firm must expend some fixed set-up cost for education of its staff to adopt and use...

We examine maximin and minimax strategies for firms under symmetric oligopoly with differentiated goods. We consider two patterns of game; the Cournot game in which strategic variables of the firms are their outputs, and the Bertrand game in which strategic variables of the firms are the prices...

We consider a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game with two sets of alternative strategic variables which are related by invertible functions. They are denoted by (s1, s2, ., sn) and (t1, t2, ., tn) for players 1, 2, ., n. The number of players is larger than two. We consider a symmetric game in...

We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in two-players game with two strategic variables and . We consider two patterns of game; one is the x-game in which strategic variables of players are x's, and the other is the p-game in which strategic variables of players are p's. We call...

We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in symmetric multi-players game with two strategic variables. We consider two patterns of game; the x-game in which strategic variables of players are x's, and the p-game in which strategic variables of players are p's. We will show that the...

In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman(1986), assuming linear demand and cost functions with fixed fee licensing it was argued that for the outside innovating firm under oligopoly when the number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market with license of its cost-reducing...

We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm to enter the market with or without licensing its new cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee, or to license its technology without entry. With general demand and...

We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm in duopoly under vertical differentiation to enter the market with or without licensing its technology for producing a higher quality good to the incumbent firm using a combination of a royalty per output and a fixed license fee, or to...