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Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886259

A note on the efficiency gains from a refusal to deal in a Bertrand-Nash framework

Nadimi, Soheil R.; Weisman, Dennis L. - In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy 20 (2020) 4, pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012405960

Collusion in quality-segmented markets

Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco - 2020

. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only …, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket only, (iii) two segment-wide cartels, and (iv) an industrywide cartel …-wide cartel prefers to maintain market shares at pre-collusive levels. The impact on consumer and social welfare critically …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306748

Mandatory upstream inputs and upward pricing pressure : implications for competition policy

Tardiff, Timothy J.; Weisman, Dennis L. - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227569

The impact of a corporate leniency program on antitrust enforcement and cartelization

Chang, Myong-hun (contributor); … - 2008

because of internal collapse or they are caught and convicted by the antitrust authority. The likelihood that a cartel, once … analysis, the impact of a leniency program on the steady-state cartel rate is investigated. Holding the enforcement policy of … provided by the leniency program induces the antitrust authority to prosecute a smaller fraction of cartel cases identified …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003787578