This article examines the conditions when predatory pricing or exclusive dealing antitrust principles should be the controlling legal standard for the evaluation of single product loyalty discount contracts. Following Meritor, it clarifies what it means for price to be “the predominant...

This insightful two-volume set presents a careful selection of the most important published papers on the economics of antitrust law. The collection focuses on areas of major importance including market power, horizontal arrangements, and vertical arrangements and exclusionary behaviour. It...

This article presents an expanded economic analysis of the potential procompetitive purposes served by exclusive dealing. Using examples taken from important antitrust cases, exclusive dealing is shown to be an efficient element in the arrangements manufacturers adopt with their dealers to...

It is undeniable that economics has had a huge effect on antitrust law over the last 30 years. Richard Posner, in the preface to the second, 2001 edition of his landmark book, Antitrust Law, notes that since the publication of the first edition of the book in 1976 there has been “a profound, a...

Economic theories of the firm are categorized into two types of theories – those that emphasize the role of the firm in mitigating holdup problems by firm ownership of residual control rights and those that emphasize the role of the firm in mitigating incentive problems by firm ownership of...

The economics of bundled discounts are examined by breaking the contract into two elements: (1) what the firm is buying, and (2) how the firm is paying for what it is buying. The firm is buying preferred distribution, a common aspect of competition for distribution that benefits consumers. The...