In this study, we find evidence of tunneling in mergers among affiliated firms that belong to Korean business groups. Using a recent sample of Korean mergers during the 2000–2020 period, we find that control-motivated mergers to enhance the controlling family’s control over the business...

This paper examines capital reallocation among firms in Korean business groups (chaebol) in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the consequences of this capital reallocation for investment and performance of chaebol firms. We show that chaebol transferred cash from low growth...

We examine Korean business groups' transitions from circular-shareholding to (relatively simple) pyramidal-shareholding structures during 2011-2018. The transition did not impact chaebol families' degrees of control or incentive conflicts in firms belonging to circular-shareholdings ("loops"),...

The Korean government doubled the total assets threshold for its large business group (chaebol) designation policy in 2016. Exploiting this policy change, I examine the value implications of a firm’s chaebol affiliation. My results suggest that firms affiliated with business groups that had...