Spontaneous or emergent orders in human affairs are based upon voluntary interactions among individuals. Yet the physical environment influences the subsequent interactions which occur. While the interactions may be voluntary, the confines of a built environment – physical systems and...

I explore the comparative vulnerability of regimes to a coup d'etat using a game-theoretic model. Analysis centers on leaders of groups capable of intervening at the time of a coup. I prove the existence of an equilibrium in which a coup is attempted without restrictions on current government...

Natural disasters are called Acts of God, but the severity of their impact depends upon many factors, including state insurance regulations. Insurance provides voluntary, contractual disaster relief - insurers agree to pay disaster losses in exchange for payment of premiums. In the United...

This Policy Comment analyzes the connection between hurricane mitigation and insurance. As many people fail to purchase government-subsidized flood and earthquake insurance, some researchers argue that market failure explains the lack of mitigation. But empirical evidence shows that markets do...

I investigate whether attempts by the media to determine a candidate's fitness for office lowers the average quality of public officials, what I call the media scrutiny paradox. Media scrutiny imperfectly signals heterogeneous candidates' type, but imposes privacy costs and reputational costs on...

I extend the standard rent seeking model to allow lobbying for a constitutional prohibition on wealth transfers. I examine two issues: (1) the ability of special interests with significant political capacity to block constitutional change; and (2) the effect of adding a constitutional stage on...

I examine the provision of free and fair elections using a decision-theoretic model in which election observers provide a noisy information signal concerning fraud. Monitoring an election is not always worth the cost and so democracy is not always sustainable. A strong preference for fair...

Stable, enforceable property rights over resources normally furthers economic efficiency. The author argues that stable rights to government created rents and wealth transfers, by contrast, generate inefficiency. Secure rights to receive transfers increases rent-seekers' incentive to make...