In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core,...

The main purpose is to prove the supermodularity (convexity) property of a cooperative game arising from an economical situation. The underlying oligopoly situation is based on a linear inverse demand function as well as linear cost functions for the participating firms. The characteristic...

The paper provides two characterizations of probabilistic values satisfying three classical axioms (linearity, dummy player and any of three "symmetry" axioms) together with a new probabilistic-efficiency axiom. This new axiom requires that players of a game allocate the total amount of their...

The family of weighted Banzhaf values for cooperativen-person TU-games is studied. First we introduce the weighted Banzhaf value for an exogenously given vector of positive weights of the players. Then we give an axiomatic characterization of the class of all possible weighted Banzhaf values....