Since Schelling, it has often been assumed that players make use of salient decision labels to achieve coordination. Consistent with previous work, we find that given equal payoffs, salient labels yield frequent coordination. However, given even minutely asymmetric payoffs, labels lose much of...

We introduce a simple, easy to implement instrument for jointly eliciting risk and ambiguity attitudes. Using this instrument, we structurally estimate a two-parameter model of preferences. Our findings indicate that ambiguity aversion is significantly overstated when risk neutrality is assumed....

Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another...

Experimental studies of risk and time-preference typically focus on one of the two phenomena. The goal of this paper is to investigate the (possible) correlation between subjects' attitude to risk and their time-preference. For this sake we ask 61 subjects to price a simple lottery in 3...

We examine the impact of relative wages on labor supply in a laboratory experiment. We test the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, making a given wage high (low) relative to other wage levels will lead to an increase (decrease) in labor supply. We find that labor supply does respond significantly...

The authors use a labor supply; relative pay; experimental economics laboratory experiment to examine the impact of relative wages on labor supply. They test the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, making a given wage high (low) relative to other wage levels will lead to an increase (decrease) in...