This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess capacity.

In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction’s emissions depend upon the local stock of private capital....

This paper gives an insight into changes in intergovernmental grants structure, focusing on the type of public project. Presenting a simple model which incorporates the endogenous determination of project type and grants structure, the results show that as the relative cost encountered by...

In a model of privately provided public goods within a repeated-game setting, Pecorino (1999) shows that it is not only possible to maintain cooperation, but it is "easy" in a large economy. Models of privately provided public goods are closely related to interregional tax competition models...

In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction’s emissions depend upon the local stock of private capital....

By incorporating a multinational private firm into the mixed duopoly model with Hotelling-type spatial competition, we show that the private firm's nationality is a matter of the public firm's location. As the share of foreign capital increases in the private (multinational) firm, the public...

Within the framework of spatial tax competition with cross-border shopping, we examine the choice of tax method between ad valorem tax and unit (specific) tax. This study shows that governments endogenously choose the ad valorem tax method not because of a classic welfare reason, but because it...

This note studies the cost-reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. The result shows that while a profit-maximizing private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a social welfare-maximizing firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as long as the market share of the...