We provide a simple model to investigate decisions about vertical separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final product of the downstream monopolist. We show that as the bargaining powers of independent complementary input suppliers grow larger,...

Manufacturers can choose to remain separate from their retailers for both incentive and strategic reasons. In this paper, strategic motives for vertical separation are examined empirically. Two data sets are used for the assessment. The first is a cross section of all contracts between private,...

This paper empirically illustrates a new aspect of vertical integration that may hurt consumer welfare other than foreclosure and misuse of rivals' information by considering the possibility that a vertical merger turns out detrimental to the merged entity. My empirical results using data from...

This paper illustrates the underlying economic logic behind the anticompetitive effects of what Ralph Winter and I have labeled vertical most favored nation restraints in Carlton and Winter (2018). Those are restraints in which one supplier tells a retailer that the retailer cannot set the...