We show how the change to differential voting rights allows dominant shareholders to retain control even after selling substantial economic ownership in the firm and diversifying their wealth. This unbundling of cash flow and control rights leads to more dispersed economic ownership and a closer...

Using a sample of voting turnouts of annual general meetings of European companies, we document that shareholder voting turnouts are significantly different according to the ownership structure of the company. Different types of shareholder classes show different voting engagements according to...

This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such arrangements enable a controlling shareholder or group to maintain a complete lock on the control...

In a more democratised equity ownership model, ought vote selling be outlawed on ‘public policy' grounds or would such a ban limit legitimate transactions. The paper suggests that there is no need to change the Australian legislative environment to accomodate some limited examples of aberrant...

We find that shareholder turnout at the general meeting of Norwegian public firms varies between 11% and 95%, being 59% on average. This turnout behavior implies that majority control requires less than one third of the average firm's shares, and that attending shareholders vote for 1.7 times...

There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in...

This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such arrangements enable a controlling shareholder or group to maintain a complete lock on the control...

We offer that, when regulators require firms to obtain stakeholder approval of a corporate decision through voting on a resolution, firms disclose additional information that is needed for stakeholders to understand the optimal nature of the proposal and to vote in favor of it. We suggest that...

The Delaware Chancery Court famously declared that the “shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests." However, the case against shareholder voting reform rests on an apparent trump card in the debate — the well-recognized problem...