This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-phone licence auction that concluded on 27 April 2000. It raised £22½ billion ($34 billion or 2½ % of GNP) and was widely described at the time as the biggest auction ever. We discuss the merits...

The author suggests a new model of demand for variety that explains why competing firms may choose very similar product lines: if firms offer different product ranges, some consumers use multiple suppliers to increase variety and, since these consumers' purchases will be sensitive to the...

Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals are independent. For affiliated signals,...

We propose a new, easy-to-implement class of payment rules, "Reference Rules" to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from "truthful bidding" are often easy for bidders to find under currently used payment rules. Reference Rules perform...

I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods--the "Product-Mix Auction." Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bid-takers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple...