The paper axiomatises a modified utilitarian aggregation rule under which different weights are assigned to utilities in different rights categories. The relationship between actions and the allocation of utility rights categories is investigated. Application is made to two famous examples which...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008 a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

La première partie propose une revue de littérature sur les jeux de congestions et les jeux de potentiel exact. La deuxième partie traite les jeux de congestion à choix unique dans le cas symétrique et propose une formule simple et pratique permettant de trouver l'ensemble de tous les...

This paper provides a simple formula describing all Nash equilibria in monotone symmetric singleton congestion games. Our approach also yields a new and short proof establishing the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this kind of congestion games.

We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.