This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb from other firms is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g., firms' absorptive capacity is treated as an...

This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...

This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...

Intro -- Contents -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. DATA -- III. ECONOMETRIC PRELIMINARIES -- IV. "INTERNATIONAL R&D SPILLOVERS" REVISITED -- V. INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL R&D SPILLOVERS -- VI. CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX A: ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION -- APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS --...

The empirical analysis in ""International R&D Spillovers"" (Coe and Helpman, 1995) is first revisited by applying modern panel cointegration estimation techniques to an expanded data set that we have constructed for the purpose of this study. The new estimates confirm the key results reported in...