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The aggregate-monotonic core
Calleja, Pedro; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 2, pp. 742-748
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008262052
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Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
Tejada, Oriol; Rafels, Carles - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 39 (2010) 1, pp. 249-259
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008384913
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Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game
Nuñez, Marina; Rafels, Carles - In: Games and economic behavior 44 (2003) 2, pp. 311-331
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008215405
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Average Monotonic Cooperative Games
Izquierdo, Josep M.; Rafels, Carles - In: Games and economic behavior 36 (2001) 2, pp. 174-192
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008216884
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The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games
Llerena, Francesc; Rafels, Carles - In: Games and economic behavior 54 (2006) 2, pp. 373-379
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008222821
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Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core
Llerena, Francesc; Rafels, Carles - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 35 (2006) 4, pp. 603
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007614135
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A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura)
Izquierdo, Josep M.; Rafels, Carles - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 41 (2012) 2, pp. 381-396
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009978134
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Stable sets and max-convex decompositions of TU games
Llerena, Francesc; Rafels, Carles - In: Top : an official journal of the Spanish Society of … 21 (2013) 2, pp. 313-322
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010146590
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An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory
Martínez-de-Albéniz, F.Javier; Rafels, Carles - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 33 (2004) 1, pp. 107-114
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007784565
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On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set
Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef H. - 1998
In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064640