, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on situations where there is no uncertainty about others …' behavior. We investigate punishment in a world with “reasonable doubt” about others' contributions. Interestingly, people … level of a setting without punishment. Our findings suggest that sufficient information accuracy about others' behavior is …

Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding … strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is … rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in large groups. However, hindrances to …

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide … punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels … because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment …

: that altruistic punishment can sustain cooperation. This paper extends their model in order to explain such recent findings …. It focuses on fear of punishment, not punishment itself, as the key mechanism to sustain contributions to the public good … differs, on average, in less than 5% compared to relevant experiments with punishment in the lab. …