Showing 261 - 270 of 345
We identify two features of final offer arbitration (FOA) which may impede settlement in a bargaining game where asymmetric information drives the failure to settle. First, under FOA the informed party has an incentive not to voluntarily reveal private information. Revealing this information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151662
The effect of changes in industry structure on the ability to maintain a cooperative level of tariff lobbying are analyzed in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement mechanism. The difficulty of maintaining cooperation is identified with the minimum discount...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014152782
The effect of changes in industry structure on the ability to maintain a cooperative level of tariff lobbying are analyzed in a repeated game setting in which a simple trigger strategy is the enforcement mechanism. The difficulty of maintaining cooperation is identified with the minimum discount...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014154002
We introduce self-serving bias into the Bebchuk (1984) model in which trials result from asymmetric information and characterize the equilibrium. An increase in the self-serving bias of a defendant who receives an offer can, under some circumstances, reduce the incidence of trial. More...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159800
Olson (1965) has argued that one way large groups overcome the free-rider problem is through by-product lobbying. The by-product firm sells a private good to potential members of the interest group and finances lobbying with its profits. It has been argued that by-product lobbying firms cannot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159893
We introduce self-serving bias into the Bebchuk (1984) model in which trials result from asymmetric information and characterize the equilibrium. An increase in the self-serving bias of a defendant who receives an offer can, under some circumstances, reduce the incidence of trial. More...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159896
In a model of pretrial bargaining under asymmetric information, we analyze the defendant’s threat to proceed to trial in the face of a rejected offer. The incidence of trial is lower when the defendant’s constraint is binding compared with the unconstrained case. The signs of some of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160743
Andreoni (1998) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations towards the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014134235
Olson (1965) argues that some large groups can overcome the free-rider problem through by-product lobbying. The by-product firm sells a private good to potential members of the interest group and finances lobbying with its profits. Others argue that by-product lobbying firms cannot survive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014136996
As a result of public outrage over lower prescription drug prices in Canada, Congress passed legislation that would allow these drugs to be imported into the United States. The lower Canadian prices reflect price regulation. Opponents of allowing these imports have argued that the U.S. will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014136999