Individuals engaged in rent seeking accumulate sector-specific human capital through learning-by-doing. If agents specialize, small reforms of the trade regime may fail to reduce the level of the rent-seeking activity. The size of the reform necessary to induce movement out of rent seeking is...

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An import competing industry hires lobbyists to obtain protection, where binding quotas may be utilized in the trade regime. Rent seekers compete with one another to obtain valuable import licenses. Rent seeking and lobbying are assumed to involve similar skills so that a reform of the...

We extend the 1986 signaling model of Reinganum and Wilde by allowing for the possibility of negative expected value (NEV) suits. If filing costs are zero, the equilibrium consistent with the D1 refinement implies that settlement offers face a rejection rate of 100%. If filing costs are...

A model of growth through the accumulation of human capital is set out and tax reforms simulated using the U.S. economy in 1985 as a basis for the benchmark parametrization. The growth rate effects of tax reform are found to be on the order of one percentage point of growth per capita. This gain...

The author argues that the college textbook market provides a clear example of monopoly seeking as described by Tullock (1967, 1980). This behavior is also known as rent seeking. Because this market is important to students, this example of rent seeking will be of particular interest to them.

Richard Epstein has argued that governments should pay compensation for regulatory actions that impose costs on a subset of society. I develop a model in which there are two groups, one of whom benefits from a regulation, and one of whom bears the costs. A potentially biased government sets the...