We study a model where some agents have private information about risky asset returns and trade to obtain capital gains, while others acquire the risky asset and hold it to maturity, forming expectations of returns based on market prices. We show that under such a structure, in addition to fully...

The competitive market is informationally efficient; people only need to know prices to implement a competitive outcome. However, the standard formulation of competition neglects any underlying market microstructure; prices—which provide all necessary information—are exogenous. This paper...

Despite the significant attention that market manipulation has received in recent years many aspects of it are poorly understood. This article identifies from the theoretical and empirical literature what we do and do not know about market manipulation, and suggests directions for future...

The idea that information frictions amplify business cycles is hard to evaluate because information is not easily measured. We propose a quantifiable information friction that amplifies output fluctuations. In our simple model of decentralized trade, income dispersion measures uncertainty about...