Why do democratic societies often impose legal restrictions that render various assets or entitlements inalienable to the individual? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against financial markets that, in a sense, work "too well." That is, I...

The authors construct a simple environment that combines a limited communication friction and a limited information friction in order to generate a role for money and intermediation. They ask whether there is any reason to expect the emergence of a banking sector (i.e., institutions that combine...

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent’s type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the...

Revised. This paper investigates the role of beliefs over monetary policy in propagating the effects of monetary policy shocks within the context of a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. In this model, monetary policy periodically switches between low- and high-money-growth regimes....

This paper develops and analyzes a macroeconomic model in which aggregate growth and fluctuations arise from the discovery and diffusion of new technologies; there are no exogenous aggregate shocks. The temporal behavior of aggregates is driven by individuals' efforts to innovate and/or make use...

Recent monetary history has been characterized by monetary authorities that appear to shift periodically between distinct policy regimes associated with higher or lower average rates of money creation. As policy regimes are not directly observable and as the rate of monetary expansion varies for...

The quantitative implications of labor-market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real-business-cycle model. Incorporating labor-market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions. In particular, hours now fluctuate...

We modify the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model studied in Green and Lin [5] to incorporate a self-interested banker who has a private record-keeping technology. A public record-keeping device does not exist. We find that there is a trade-off between sophisticated contracts that possess relatively good...

Why do democratic societies often impose legal restrictions that render various assets or entitlements inalienable, thereby limiting the disposable property rights of individuals? The explanation proposed here is that these constraints arise as an institutional response against private debt...