Uncertainty and learning play an important role in addressing the problem of climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, it has been shown that learning usually has a negative impact...

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful...

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the results achieved so far are overly specific. Therefore, we develop a more general framework that enables us to...

We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the...

In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported...

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the...