developing countries) enter a coalition only if they do not have to reduce as much. While equity preferences improve upon the … in population size and per capita emissions, generally no coalition will be stable without restrictions on entry into or … exit out of a coalition. In such a situation, equity-orientation does not improve upon the prospects for cooperation. …

climate coalition work as an incentive mechanism for countries to join in. A multi-stage strategic trade framework is used in … which coalition (fringe) countries can dispose of a policy set comprising a discriminatory import-tariff on dirty goods as …

international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a … games with continuous strategy space -- 13. Coalition models : a first approach -- 14. Coalition models : a second approach … -- 15. Coalition models : a third approach -- 16. Summary and conclusions …

-linkage literature. In particular, we propose a preferential free trade agreement on which a climate coalition should be built. The basic … idea is that the benefits of free trade provide strong incentives for free riders to join the coalition. As a framework, a … heart of our approach are the trade privileges granted to coalition members shifting the terms of trade favourably without …

' emission reduction without contributing to abatement policies itself. Game theory suggests that issue linkage may help to …

stable climate coalition is large in the Paris Agreement and small in the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions reductions of a … single coalition country are much more pronounced in the Kyoto Protocol, so that this per-country-emissions-reduction effect … outweighs the disadvantageous coalition-size effect. …