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Ansink, Erik - 2015

coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030918

River Sharing and Water Trade

Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael F.; Weikard, Hans-Peter - 2012

coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170651

Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification uncertainty : conference paper

Köke, Sonja; Lange, Andreas - 2013 - Work in progress

In this paper we analyze how ratification uncertainty impacts the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We relax the frequent assumption of countries as unitary actors by modeling the ratification stage through uncertain preferences of a ratifying agent (e.g. the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339399

Stability of International Environmental Agreements under Isoelastic Utility

Nkuiya, Bruno - 2019

including the coalition of all countries are stable, but only when the potential gain from cooperation is sufficiently high …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012859269

Global environmental agreements and international trade : asymmetry of countries matters

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014

climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend … on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of … higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428830

Global environmental agreements and international trade : asymmetry of countries matters

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462841

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Françoise - 2010

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974150

Equity as a prerequisite for stable cooperation in a public-good economy : the core revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2010

distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983187

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316192

Coalition-Proof Stability and Optimal Surplus Sharing in International Environmental Agreements

Shinohara, Ryusuke - 2021

In a Nash equilibrium of voluntary participation games in international environmental agreements, the optimal surplus sharing rules, proposed by Eyckmans and Finus (2004) and Weikard (2009), incentivize more countries to participate in the agreements. We examine how robust this desirability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219247