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The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form

Ju, Yuan - 2004

rationality under a certain condition, and well balances the trade-off between coalition effects and externality effects. By …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069994

A Non-Cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality Ntu-Coalition Games

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2003

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non … we call - game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to - and - core … stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the - game, we develop an extension called an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014085162

A non-cooperative foundation of core-stability in positive externality NTU-coalition games

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001776479

A non-cooperative foundation of core-stability in positive externality NTU-coalition games

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2003

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non … we call H-game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to ?- and ?-core … stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the H-game, we develop an extension called an I …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591220

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Carraro, Carlo - 2012

Transfers often play a crucial role in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs). However, the economic literature on transfers is very limited and results achieved so far do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713422

Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-Up Climate Regimes

Carraro, Carlo - 2012

No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713459

Parallel Climate Blocs : Incentives to Cooperation in International Climate Negotiations

Carraro, Carlo; Buchner, Barbara K. - 2012

's incentive to belong to a climate coalition. In our setting, a given country can either join one of the existing climate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054244

China and the evolution of the present climate regime

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001883163

Emissions trading regimes and incentives to participate in international climate agreements

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001883191

China and the evolution of the present climate regime

Buchner, Barbara; Carraro, Carlo - 2003

The recent events that followed the US decision not to comply with the Kyoto Protocol seem to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic factors and policy strategies that might help the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592976