This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an … increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega …). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with …

Bank CEOs are held personally accountable for firms' performance, including the downside risk. Operational risk is …

Bank CEOs are held personally accountable for firms' performance, including the downside risk. Operational risk is …

For Relational Governance Variables For Australian Banks -- Chapter 6. Key Questions And Core Failures In Bank Governance … Shareholder Value -- Chapter 9. Overview Of Stage 2 Bank-Specific Key Code And Advanced Handbook For Australian Banks -- Part III …: Governance Of Banks In The GFC And Beyond Key Field No 5 (Part 3): Bank-Specific Coverage And Relational Proximity Rating Results …

lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk-reducing effect when banks … are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation …

reduce significant idiosyncratic operational losses. A systemic risk event that leads to significant losses in a bank holding …