theory. …

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …

-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come … signatories the coalition size are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding …

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free riding … investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay … in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several …

rationality under a certain condition, and well balances the trade-off between coalition effects and externality effects. By …

picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However … from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …

-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come … signatories - the coalition size - are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding …

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …

theory. Kyoto-Protocol, Cartel formation game, Non-cooperative game theory …