Purpose – This paper analyzes how Research and Development (R&D) cartelization and Research Joint Ventures (RJV) affect firms that engage in Cournot competition in their product market using a model in which the Home and Foreign firm produce differentiated products and export their total...

This paper analyzes the joint design of innovation and competition policy. It focuses on collusion sustainability changes due to implementation of antitrust fines and R&D subsidies in an extension of a model by Miyagiwa (2009). Generic subsidies for R&D are found not to facilitate collusion,...

The paper analyzes the profitability of RDcooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers RDcompetition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers RDcartelization to RJV cartelization when...

Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility...

We examine whether cooperation in R&D leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated-game framework. Innovation under competitive R&D creates inter-firm asymmetries, which destabilizes the collusive...

In the standard two-stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well-known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a...