I study the estimation of finite sequential games with perfect information. The major challenge in estimation is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. I show that this complication resolves when unobserved...

We show that dealers' limited market participation, coupled with an informational friction resulting from lack of market transparency, can make liquidity demand upward sloping, inducing strategic complementarities: traders demand more liquidity when the market becomes less liquid, fostering...

We show that dealers' limited market participation, coupled with an informational friction resulting from lack of market transparency, can make liquidity demand upward sloping, inducing strategic complementarities: traders demand more liquidity when the market becomes less liquid, fostering...

How do people make choices in a dynamic stochastic environment when they face uncertainty about the return of their choices? The classical approach to this problem is to assume consumers use dynamic programming to obtain the optimal decision rule. However, this approach has two drawbacks. First,...

In this paper, we discuss a scenario in capital structure where two divisional managers compete for capital from a firm for their projects in a perfect information setting. Each project’s profit is an inverted u-shape function with respect to capital. We consider verifiable profits and study...

In an oligopoly configuration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a finite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and the presence of three identical firms, we show that two of them (the predators) can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third (the...