We analyze risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard. Without deposit-linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk-sensitive, incentive- compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive, deregulared environment,...

We examine a bank's choice of whether to fund the loans it originates by emitting deposits or to sell the loans to investors. With common knowledge of loan quality and laissez faire banking, we find that the choice is irrelevant. With asymmetric information but without government intervention,...

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Abbreviated Contents -- Extended Contents -- Preface -- Pedagogy -- Organization -- Supplementary Materials -- Instructor's Manual/Test Bank/Transparency Master -- Acknowledgments -- About the Authors -- Introduction -- Some more on the organization of...

Stuart Greenbaum and Anjan Thakor bring a unique analytical approach to the subject of banks and banking in this completely revised and updated new edition. They expand the scope of the typical bank management course by addressing all types of deposit-type financial institutions and by...