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Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant

Jurdziak, Leszek - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

The newest outcome of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant analysis have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution maximising joint profits not only in quantity of lignite - the size and shape of the ultimate pit (characteristic to classical solution) but also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621826

The core of a coalitional exchange economy.

Mercato, Elena L. del - Maison des Sciences Économiques, Université Paris 1 … - 2006

members of a coalition should be represented. It seems economically reasonable that our knowledge and our possibility to make … decisions depend on the coalition we belong to. We define a coalitional exchange economy by considering a pure exchange economy … in which the individual consumption sets of consumers within a coalition depend on the membership of the coalition. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696857

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier - In: Economics Bulletin 34 (2014) 1, pp. 188-199

We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the so-called Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k,for any k,and that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737503

Inventory games with permissible delay in payments

Li, Jun; Feng, Hairong; Zeng, Yinlian - In: European Journal of Operational Research 234 (2014) 3, pp. 694-700

through population monotonic allocation scheme. Under this allocation rule, the grand coalition is shown to be stable from a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738170

The core of games on distributive lattices : how to share benefits in a hierarchy

Grabisch, Michel; Xie, Lijue - HAL - 2008

Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the most popular solution concept since it is based on some rationality condition. In many real situations, not all possible coalitions can form, so that classical TU-games cannot be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738449

The core of games on k-regular set systems

Xie, Lijue; Grabisch, Michel - HAL - 2009

In the classical setting of cooperative game theory, it is always assumed that all coalitions are feasible. However in many real situations, there are restrictions on the set of coalitions, for example duo to communication, order or hierarchy on the set of players, etc. There are already many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738649

Linear Transforms, Values and Least Square Approximation for Cooperation Systems

Faigle, Ulrich; Grabisch, Michel - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2014

We study linear properties of TU-games, revisiting well-known issues like interaction transforms, the inverse Shapley value problem and the concept of semivalues and least square values. We embed TU-games into the model of cooperation systems and influence patterns, which allows us to introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010742024

Cooperative games with size-truncated

Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2013

We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746932

The equity core and the core

Vilella, Cori - In: Economics Bulletin 34 (2014) 1, pp. 313-323

core if no coalition can divide its value among its members proportionally to a given weight system and, in this way, give …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747091

Autonomous coalitions.

Gonzalez, Stéphane; Grabisch, Michel - Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 … - 2014

We consider in this paper solutions for TU-games where it is not assumed that the grand coalition is necessarily the … final state of cooperation. Partitions of the grand coalition, or balanced collections together with a system of balancing …, that is, coalitions for which any solution of the d-core yields a payment for that coalition equal to its worht. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010791258