With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

Evidence is adduced that the sages of the ancient Babylonian Talmud, as well as some of the medieval commentators theorem, were well aware of sophisticated concepts of modern theories of risk-bearing.

This paper undertakes a careful examination of the concept of conditional probability and its use. The ideas are then applied to resolve a conceptual puzzle related to Savage's "Sure-Thing Principle."

An invited contribution to a symposium on “Information and Knowledge in Economics,” to appear in Econ Journal Watch. Topics discussed include the distinction between information and knowledge; awareness; logical omniscience; the cost of calculation; semantic and syntactic models of knowledge,...

Nobel Lecture.

Define the riskiness of a gamble as the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion (ARA) of an individual with constant ARA who is indifferent between taking and not taking that gamble. We characterize this index by axioms, chief among them a "duality" axiom which, roughly speaking, asserts that...

The Presidential Address at the First International Congress of the Game Theory Society, held in Bilbao, Spain, in July of 2000. The address contains a discussion of the Congress, of the functions and activities of the Society, of the Logo of the Society, of past accomplishments of the...