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Minimum wage restrictions and employee effort in incomplete labor markets : an experimental investigation

Owens, Mark F.; Kagel, John H. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 73 (2010) 3, pp. 317-326

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974025

Ascending prices and package bidding : a theoretical and experimental analysis

Kagel, John H.; Lien, Yuanchuan; Milgrom, Paul - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 2 (2010) 3, pp. 160-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008701650

Selection bias, demographic effects, and ability effects in common value auction experiments

Casari, Marco; Ham, John C.; Kagel, John H. - In: The American economic review 97 (2007) 4, pp. 1278-1304

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003586390

Learning and transfer in signaling games

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 34 (2008) 3, pp. 415-439

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003607010

Introduction to issue of Experimental economics in honor of Raymond C. Battalio

Kagel, John H.; Van Huyck, John Bronston - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 10 (2007) 3, pp. 201-204

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003608160

Gamsonś law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

Fréchette, Guillaume R.; Kagel, John H.; Morelli, Massimo - In: Games and economic behavior 51 (2005) 2, pp. 365-390

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002940181

On the existence of predatory pricing : an experimental study of reputation and entry deterrence in the chain-store game

Jung, Yun-joo; Kagel, John H.; Levin, Dan - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003571981

Survival auctions

Kagel, John H.; Pevnitskaya, Svetlana; Ye, Lixin - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 33 (2007) 1, pp. 103-119

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003510756

Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams : forward induction or faster adaptive learning?

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 63 (2009) 4, pp. 216-224

Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943316

Information exchange in group decision making : the hidden profile problem reconsidered

Lightle, John P.; Kagel, John H.; Arkes, Hal R. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 55 (2009) 4, pp. 568-581

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003859223