"The current German government, against the odds, has managed to introduce a number of labour market reforms previously seen as impossible. The reforms are briefly outlined, and the author, drawing on a number of theoretical approaches, suggests a number of reasons why these reforms have...

We develop a model in which firms in the financial market lobby the government to lower compulsory contributions to the public pension system. Firms lobby in order to increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. We conclude with a comparison of two major pension reforms in...

We estimate a linear and a piecewise linear Phillips curve model with regional labor market data for West German and Neue Länder. Employing regional observations allows us to country difference the data. This eliminates, under the assumption of homogeneous Länder, supply shocks and changes in...

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary...

The matching function has become a popular tool in labor economics. It relates job creation (a flow variable) to two stock variables: vacancies and job searchers. In most studies the matching function is considered to be exogenous and assumed to have certain properties. The present study,...

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the homecountry and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy...

A striking feature of OECD labor markets in the 1990s has been the very rapid increase of temporary agency work. We augment the equilibrium unemployment model as developed by Pissarides and Mortensen with temporary work agencies in order to focus on their role as matching intermediaries and to...

When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges...