Is there a fundamental conflict between insulating monetary policy from popular pressures, seen as essential to sound monetary policy, and making policy responsive to the popular will, seen as fundamental to democracy? We argue that strongly independent monetary policy is not inconsistent with...

An orthodox rationale for the independence of central banking is the possession, by central banks, of a technocratic mandate. Even critics of central banking take that presumption at face value. This paper questions whether central banks possess any distinctive technical competence at all

The question of central bank independence is one of degree. A completely independent central bank is impossible as long as a country has provisions for altering central bank powers, even if that requires constitutional amendments. On the other hand, any central bank has at least some discretion...

Discussions on Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) have so far mostly focused on the potential risks that these currencies could represent for financial intermediation and financial stability. It is important, however, to also consider how they could contribute to the welfare of citizens,...