Students of U.S. banking history typically hold that the check collection industry was excessively costly prior to 1915 and that the Fed's subsequent entry into check clearing improved efficiency. The authors propose an alternative view based on the economics of network communications...

Check collection has a puzzling feature. The collecting bank earns one day's additional interest by presenting a check to the paying bank one day sooner. The puzzle is that it is difficult to identify a commensurate social benefit associated with presenting a check one day earlier. Collecting...

Alternative payment instruments are studied in an economy with private information, delayed communication, and limited commitment. Attention is restricted to checks and bank drafts, which differ in resource cost and communication characteristics. Checks are less costly but settlement delays...

A legal obligation envisages performance and is extinguished when the required performance is duly made. Monetary obligations must normally be discharged by the payment of the appropriate sum of money, that is to say, by means of legal tender. It is trite that a cheque is not legal tender and...

In this Data Point we present the results of several analyses of consumers' experiences with overdrafts at a number of large banks. In many instances we break down our results by an account holder's status under Regulation E requirements (also known as “opt-in status”). This refers to the...

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released a data point update of its ongoing analyses of overdrafts. We review the report and provide commentary on its findings, methodology and the inferences of this update, specifically the potential to further restrict debit card overdrafts. We...

A common corporate cash management strategy is to delay payments owed to suppliers. We examine whether buyers pay suppliers faster in response to a recent regulatory change in the United Kingdom that mandates the public disclosure of buyers’ payment practices. We find that after the regulatory...