We provide a discussion of concave optimization theory subject to linear constraints and some robust applications of the theory including a study of homogeneous programming games and axiomatic analysis of the social choice rule which selects market equilibrium allocations

The exact problem we are concerned with in this paper is of the following nature. There are a finite number of producers each equipped with a utility function of the standard variety, which converts an input into a producer specific output. An allocation of the input among the producers is...

In this paper we obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable set of a weak tournament. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for unique stable sets as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for the stable sets to coincide with cores

In this paper we prove some new results and provide some new proofs of existing theorems in the coperative theory of two sided matching. We also develop the cooperative theory of partitioned maching problems

In this paper we provide axiomatic characterizations of what we call the preference for the freedom of optimal choice, which ranks feasible sets according to the number of best elements it contains with respect to a given binary relation. In a final section of this paper, we provide an axiomatic...

In this paper we attempt to arrive at axiomatic characterizations of choice functions which are subrational and where chosen elements are a subset of the solution set obtained by maximizing a binary relation. We also try to provide axiomatic characterizations of choice functions where choice...

We consider a finite universal set of alternatives and the set of all feasible sets are simply the set of all non-empty subsets of this universal set. A choice function assigns to each feasible set a non-empty subset of it. In such a framework we propose and study necessary and sufficient...

We consider a finite universal set of alternatives and the set of all feasible sets are simply the set of all non-empty subsets of this universal set. A choice function assigns to each feasible set a non-empty subset of it. In such a framework we propose and study necessary and sufficient...

In this paper a model for the aggregation of ballot profiles is considered.In this framework some new results are obtained:the characterization of the plurality aggregator and the non existence of a vote aggregator which is anonymous and yet preserves proximity