We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented...

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained...

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. Minority candidate can illicitly...

In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes

This paper compares the ability to select the efficient policy of a parliamentary and a presidential constitutional setup. In order to do it we build a dynamic theoretical model with asymmetric information that succeeds in addressing both the politicians accountability and the competence...

The effect of constitutional structures (such as the effect of a presidential vs. a parliamentary system) over policy outcomes has been widely studied in the economic literature. In this paper, we investigate whether stable parliamentary systems and unstable parliamentary systems behave...