A Principal-Agent model in which the principal and the agent are ambiguity averse is examined. A novel role for the optimal contract is to induce a speci c partition of the state space for the agent as a means of manipulating the ambiguity he faces, thereby providing more efficient contracting....

Testing for long-run abnormal performance has become an increasingly important part of the finance literature. We propose a test for abnormal performance in long-run event studies using the buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR). We augment the control firm approach of Barber and Lyon (1997) by...

We examine the importance of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, in the capital structure decision. We develop a static tradeoff theory model in which agents are both risk averse and ambiguity averse. The model confirms the usual idea that increased risk--the uncertainty over known possible...

We consider the design of securities that govern the distribution of cash flows and control rights for an investment project. An entrepreneur, endowed with managerial talent, contracts with an outside investor for required capital. Optimal contracts stipulate that the ownership of control and...

We derive a model of bond pricing under ambiguity, showing that ambiguity interacts with risk to determine spreads. Since default is an inherently "unfavorable" outcome, ambiguity-averse bondholders overweigh its probability and demand higher yields for bonds with higher ambiguity.Empirically,...

The new issues market is used to examine the impact of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion on the pricing of financial assets. An IPO process is modeled assuming ambiguity regarding the returns on financial assets and risk and ambiguity aversion on the part of agents. Theoretically, the underwriter...

A Principal-Agent model is examined in which the principal and the agent are ambiguity averse. With a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent the presence of ambiguity aversion implies that the principal will not always fully insure the agent when effort is observable. Instead, risk may...