A model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group. Subjects invariably bid the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and...

This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both traditional and adaptive, in the light of recent experiments by Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (henceforth "VHBB") in which subjects repeatedly played coordination games, uncertain only about each other's...

This paper reports experiments designed to study strategic sophistication, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. Subjects played normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique...

In Taipei we observed a dual Dutch fish auction, like a conventional Dutch auction with bundling but with the roles of quantity and price reversed, and fish the numeraire rather than money. This paper uses a symmetric independent private values framework to study how duality interacts with...

This review discusses selected work in experimental game theory. My goals are to further the dialogue between theorists and empiricists that has driven progress in economics and game theory and to guide future experimental work. I focus on experiments whose lessons are relevant to establishing...

This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers' labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber's (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and Botond Kőszegi and Matthew Rabin's (2006; henceforth “KR”) theory of reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income,...