Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample...

Are CEOs' attitudes and beliefs linked to their fims' innovative performance? This paper uses Malmendier and Tate's measure of overconfidence, based on CEO stock-option exercise, to study the relationship between a CEO's "revealed beliefs" about future performance and standard measures of...

Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are frequently used to measure the effects of managerial incentives on corporate innovation. However, these estimates suffer from two data problems. First, corporate innovation data have a discrete spike at zero because many firms never engage in corporate...

Managerial overconfidence, originally disputed in terms of finance and accounting, has been dated back to Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b). Galasso and Simcoe (2011) studied the relationship between CEO overconfidence and innovation, focusing on patents, in which they found that overconfident CEO...

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO age and firm innovation measured as innovation productivity (i.e., the number of patent applications) and innovation scope (i.e., technological proximity). Using a sample of 11,194 firm-year observations from the Korean stock markets for the...

The purpose of this article is to examine whether R&D expenditure is biased downwards because of self-serving behavior of highly incentivized managers. This offers an insight into the general relationship between incentives and opportunism. Using instrumental variables and panel data methods for...