In this paper, we introduce the concept of the compatibility of two transferable utility cooperative games. Two games … are compatible if there exists at least one allocation which belongs to the core of both games. We look at the class of …

This paper studies egalitarianism in the context of nontransferable utility games by introducing and analyzing the … of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and …

This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for …. For transferable utility games, the main axiomatic solution is the Shapley Value and this chapter deals with values of NTU … games , i.e., solutions for NTU games that coincide with the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. We survey …

cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to … coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We …. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies … induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property. -- Coalition formation ; Core ; Paradox of smaller coalitions …