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Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more … informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610

Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing : theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence

Güth, Werner; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra - 2018

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944106

Coordination failure in capacity-then-price-setting games

Güth, Werner; Stadler, Manfred; Zaby, Alexandra - 2019

In capacity-then-price-setting games, soft capacity constraints are planned sales amounts where producing above capacity is possible but more costly. While the subgame perfect equilibrium predicts equal prices, experimental evidence often reveals price discrepancies. This failure to coordinate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976964