competition authorities in developing a theory of harm when prosecuting cartels, and also for the customers of the cartel firms … price collusion are far from clear because the cartel firms might deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting … infrequently observed in cartel cases. It also reviews theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature in economics showing …

This paper analyzes price discrimination of an upstream cartel in the presence of a dominant firm at the retail level …. Charging different wholesale prices creates a bond between the upstream cartel and the favored downstream firm. This bond … reduces or eliminates this firm's incentives to accept deviation offers from upstream cartel members. When a cartel price …

that in absence of any penalty on cartel, a firm always prefers a cartel to merger, when the latter does not involve any … any incentive to form a cartel and they merge only if there are efficiencies involved. We also show that higher … concentration among the competitive fringe lowers the profitability of merger as compared to cartel. We then discuss the impact of …

collusive agreement put in place by a cartel in the "Lunch Coupon" market, also in Italy, that was uncovered and convicted by …

We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two …

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free … cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly … sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …