A model of credit as a pairwise activity is studied in a random matching model where there are no social sanction mechanisms. The model depicts some prevalent features of credit arrangements. Even though there are no informational asymmetries and the price of credit is determined competitively,...

The agents are matched randomly, and they are allowed to choose whether to become buyers or sellers, or which good to produce. The terms of trade as well as the allocation of the agents in different roles depend on the trading mechanism. The goods may be traded by using auctions, bargaining, or...

We construct a centralised market where agents can trade voting rights. Text book markets do not work but the situation is strategic, and there are many equilibria. In an equilibrium where trading takes place the minimum efficiency gain, i.e. the probability with which an efficient outcome is...

Rubinstein type bargaining is extended to n-person case with linear utilities. The game possesses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which evelybody's share is equal as impatience goes to zero.