This paper considers a principal-agent model with auditing and collusion, in which the audit costs are a convex function of the audit reliability. The focus of interest is the question of the audit reliability chosen by the principal. It turns out that the optimal audit reliability strongly...

This paper provides a proof of Granger's (1986) error correction model for fractionally cointegrated variables and points out a necessary assumption that has not been noted before. Moreover, a simpler, alternative error correction model is proposed which can be employed to estimate fractionally...

This discussion provides several explanations for the evidence presented in Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) that are consistent with efficient contracting. I also show that - contrary to the suggestion of the title - CEOs do not benefit from value destroying growth in earnings. Finally, I argue...

This study examines whether the CEO uses share repurchases to sell her equity grants at inflated stock prices, a concern regularly voiced in politics and media. We find that the timing of buyback programs and equity compensation, i.e., the granting, vesting, and selling of equity, is largely...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

"This paper studies the reasons and the costs of separating ownership from control by analysing the decision of German dual class firms to consolidate their share structure from dual to single class equity between 1990 and 2001. We find that the firm value increases significantly by an average...

This paper investigates which comparables selection method generates the most precise forecasts when valuing European companies with the enterprise value to EBIT multiple. We also consider the USA as a reference point. It turns out that selecting comparable companies with similar return on...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...