For the Kreps and Wilson version of Selten's Chain Store Game, every equilibrium of every stable set induces the same outcome. This unique outcome is the ne induced by the Kreps and Wilson solution.

We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each player's optimal reply agrees with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite, a...

We extend the results of Blume, Brandenberger, and Dekel (1991b) to obtain a finite characterization of perfect equilibria in terms of lexicographic probability systems (LPSs). The LPSs we consider are defined over individual strategy sets and thus capture the property of independence among...

We apply three axioms adapted from decision theory to refinements of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall that select connected closed sub- sets called solutions. No player uses a weakly dominated strategy in an equilibrium in a solution. Each solution contains a quasi-perfect...

Three axioms from decision theory are applied to refinements that select connected subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The first axiom requires all equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, i.e. each player's strategy is an admissible optimal reply to other...

We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form with perfect recall. We prove that if payoffs are generic then the outcomes of stable sets of equilibria defined via homological essentiality by Mertens coincide with those defined via homotopic...

We define a refinement of Nash equilibria called metastability. This refinement supposes that the given game might be embedded within any global game that leaves its local bestreply correspondence unaffected. A selected set of equilibria is metastable if it is robust against perturbations of...

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The outcome satisfies forward...