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From a variant of Kuhn's triangulation we derive a discrete version of the Global Newton Method that yields an epsilon-equilibrium of an N-player game and then sequentially reduces epsilon toward zero to obtain any desired precision or the best precision for any number of iterations
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724858
amp;#65279;An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each player's optimal reply agrees with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012729411
We examine Hillas and Kohlberg's conjecture that invariance to the addition of payoff-redundant strategies implies that a backward induction outcome survives deletion of strategies that are inferior replies to all equilibria with the same outcome. That is, invariance and backward induction imply...
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We define the class of two-player zero-sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For games in this class we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game and minimax or Nash equilibrium strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168549
Three axioms from decision theory are applied to refinements that select connected subsets of the Nash equilibria of games with perfect recall. The first axiom requires all equilibria in a selected subset to be admissible, i.e. each player's strategy is an admissible optimal reply to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210404
We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576684
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862611