This paper considers optimal insurance schemes in a principal-agent multi-dimensional environment in which two types of risk averse agents differ in both risk and attitude to risk. Risk corresponds to any pair of distribution functions (not necessarily ordered by any of the usual dominance...

We consider symmetric auctions that may be multi-unit, with multi-dimensional bids and correlated multi-dimensional signals. Payment and allocation mechanisms are quite arbitrary. There are n potential bidders and the process of submitting a bid involves cost, which may be random and may vary...

We consider an augmented version of the symmetric private value auction model with independent types. The augmentation, intended to illustrate reality, concerns information bidders have about their opponents. To the standard assumption that every bidder knows his type and the distribution of...

Actions in games that address economic environments such as auctions and oligopoly games are typically costly, and signals are interdependent. Consequently, such games may not have equilibria supported by monotone strategies (monotone equilibria, see Landsberger and Tsirelson (1999)and (2000))....