We model the settlement of a legal dispute where the trial outcome depends on the behavior of a strategically motivated judge. We consider a standard asymmetric information model where the uninformed defendant makes a take it or leave it offer. If the case goes to trial, the judge decides how...

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that...

This study investigates the implications of risk premium shocks for aggregate fluctuations in a small open economy with financial and informational frictions. A dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework is developed, where the informational asymmetries among the agents in the model and...

This paper presents computationally simple estimators for the index coefficients in a binary choice model with a binary endogenous regressor without relying on distributional assumptions or on large support conditions and yields root-n consistent and asymptotically normal estimators. We develop...

We solve a class of identification problems for nonparametric and semiparametric models when the endogenous covariate is discrete with unbounded support. Then we proceed with an approach that resolves a polynomial basis problem for the above class of discrete distributions, and for the...

There is a conflict in the mechanism for price determination used in a Marshallian partial equilibrium supply and demand framework and the Walrasian general equilibrium framework. It is generally thought that partial equilibrium is a simplified approximation to the complexities of the general...

The aim of this paper is to understand what a recession means for individual consumers, and to model in a life-cycle framework how individuals respond to recessions. Our focus is on the sharp increase in savings rates that have been observed in the current and recent recessions. We show...

This paper builds a model of sovereign debt in which default risk, interest rates, and debt depend not only on current fundamentals but also on news about future fundamentals. News shocks affect equilibrium outcomes because they contain information about the likelihood that the government repays...