Häufig kann beobachtet werden, dass Konsumenten aufgrund unzureichender Produktinformationen den Preis als Qualitätssignal interpretieren und so eine vereinfachte Kaufentscheidung treffen, indem sie insbesondere hochpreisige Produkte wählen. Zum anderen genießen auch externe...

We introduce credit frictions motivated by moral hazard in a general equilibrium model of international trade with two dimensions of heterogeneity and endogenous investments. Firms' competitiveness consists of capabilities to conduct process and quality innovations at low costs, whereas...

Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...

We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...